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UNIONS AS CONDUITS OF DEMOCRATIC
VOICE FOR NON-ELITES: WORKER
POLITICIZATION FROM THE SHOP
FLOOR TO THE HALLS
OF CONGRESS
Michael Wasser*
J. Ryan Lamare**
In a presidential election year that saw candidates spend record sums to show
they can best represent middle class voters, data reveals politicians have become
significantly wealthier than their middle class constituents. This paper proposes an
initial model for understanding how unions facilitate and support economic non-elite
political candidates, thereby helping to increase political pluralism. Drawing upon
social identity theory, we argue that unions enable economic non-elites to develop
political skill sets through experience in the traditional industrial relations process
and access to union membership opportunities. We test this model through case study
analysis and propose opportunities for further research.
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION FOR STUDY
In a 1984 correspondence with New York journalist Bob Grady, U.S. Sen-
ator Daniel Patrick Moynihan explained that he needed the money earned by
writing and lecturing outside of his job in the Senate to help pay the bills. The
senior senator from New York lamented the fact that while nearly half of the
senators qualify as millionaires—a group he did not belong to—only earnings,
not the capital gains income of his wealthier colleagues, were limited by
recently enacted ethics laws. He concluded that carving out an exception in
ethics rules that seemingly only protected the income streams of the super-
wealthy “could become a problem for democracy.”1
Since Sen. Moynihan wrote these words in 1984, Congress’s wealth dis-
parity has only increased. In the time span from when Sen. Moynihan wrote his
letter in 1984 to 2009, the median net worth of a member of the U.S. House of
Representatives more than doubled. Not counting home values, the median
worth of a congressman serving with Sen. Moynihan in 1984 was $280,000
after adjusting for inflation. The median worth of a congressman in 2009 was
$725,000. During this time, the corresponding median net worth of an Ameri-
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can family has dropped from $20,600 to $20,500.2 Put another way, the typical
legislator today is far less likely to be an economic non-elite, someone who
cannot draw upon great individual wealth.
This increased likelihood that a member of congress today comes from the
economic elite coincides with the growth in economic inequality and corporate
dominance in politics. As Hacker and Pierson observe, “[i]f the total income
growth [during the years 1979–2005] were a pie . . . the slice enjoyed by the
roughly 300,000 people in the top tenth of 1 percent would be half again as
large as the slice enjoyed by the roughly 180 million in the bottom 60 per-
cent.”3 This is also the period of time that has witnessed the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the National Federation of Independent Businesses, and other cor-
porate lobbying outfits dramatically expand operations. Today, lobbying is a $3
billion per year industry in Washington, DC.4 Of course, today we also see
more industrial deregulation, increased privatization in the public sector, grow-
ing disparities in tax cuts between the rich and everyone else, and a sustained
attack on collective bargaining and the right of workers to organize unions.
Stated simply, there appears to be a clear consequence to the diminishing voice
of non-elites in our country’s democratic processes.
Keeping such outcomes in mind, the comments of Mitt Romney, the
Republican presidential candidate in 2012, raise an intriguing question. Rom-
ney recounted what his father George Romney, former governor of Michigan,
once advised him: “[N]ever get involved in politics if you have to win an elec-
tion to pay a mortgage.”5 The data on congressional pay suggest this is true—
individuals who are becoming involved in politics and winning seats do not
need the pay provided by the position.
So, how are economic non-elites able to get into politics? One obvious
place to start the search is the labor movement. It is not a secret that unions
play an influential role in electoral politics. We know they financially support
candidates, educate their memberships on the important issues, and mobilize
voters. What we know less about is the role that organized labor plays in devel-
oping and supporting union members, likely economic non-elites, to success-
fully run for public office.
In this paper, we seek to formulate an initial model for understanding how
unions enable and support workers who want to directly participate in politics,
even those who need to win an election to pay the mortgage. Our model con-
nects the traditional role unions play in enabling voice at the workplace with
their role in supporting non-elite candidates for public office. We argue that it
is through the process of traditional industrial relations (and the presence of a
2 Peter Whoriskey, Growing Wealth Widens Distance Between Lawmakers and Constitu-
ents, WASH. POST (Dec. 26, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/grow
ing-wealth-widens-distance-between-lawmakers-and-constituents/2011/12/05/gIQAR7D6IP
_story.html.
3 JACOB S. HACKER & PAUL PIERSON, WINNER-TAKE-ALL POLITICS: HOW WASHINGTON
MADE THE RICH RICHER—AND TURNED ITS BACK ON THE MIDDLE CLASS 3 (2010).
4 Id. at 114.
5 Sarah Kliff, Perhaps George Romney Was Right: Study Says Higher Salaries Linked to
Worse Politicians, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Jan. 9, 2012, 12:24 PM), http://www.washing
tonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/post/george-romney-was-right-study-says-higher-salaries
-linked-to-worse-politicians/2012/01/09/gIQABtrjlP_blog.html.
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union) that non-elites become politicized and gain attributes that allow them to
successfully run for elected office, and frame this argument around concepts
gleaned specifically from social identity theory.
LABOR’S ROLE IN THE POLITICAL PROCESS
Our efforts to better understand how labor facilitates the voice of non-
elites in the halls of American democracy contribute to a long-running body of
social science literature examining labor’s role as a political actor. This section
briefly reviews this previous work to establish the foundation and context for
our study. In doing so, we examine the historical role of unions in politics and
consider previous studies of union political activity.
That there would be so little known about how unions enable economic
non-elites to directly participate in the political process speaks to organized
labor’s historic position in U.S. politics. As evidenced by Samuel Gompers’s
1919 declaration that “an independent political labor party becomes either radi-
cal, so-called, or else reactionary, but it is primarily devoted to one thing and
that is vote-getting,” the role of U.S. unions in politics has been one of political
pressure, not party creation and politician cultivation.6 In fact, up until 1947,
the American Federation of Labor (AFL) chose not to align itself with any
particular party. Rather, the federation took a path of voluntarism, supporting
any political party or candidate who endorsed its political priorities.7
This nonpartisan strategy set the U.S. labor movement on a very different
course than its brethren across Europe who were intricately connected to party
politics. Unions such as those in Britain established a formal Labor Party that
was a direct extension of the labor movement. Conversely, in countries like
Sweden, Italy, and France, political parties created unions for workers to join.8
In either form, unions and political parties existed as one; undoubtedly, this
interweaving of workers and political party structures was related to a far
higher degree of class-consciousness experienced by European workers than
their American counterparts. Through both strong class-consciousness and an
inviting party structure, economic non-elites represented by unions in these
countries held an organic path for direct participation in their governments. No
such path, however, existed for American union members.
In the late 1930s, an indirect path began to emerge for U.S. economic non-
elites to influence the political discourse as labor’s adherence to voluntarism
subsided. The movement toward a more active role in politics started when the
Congress of Industrial Organizations (CIO) broke away from the AFL. In the
midst of organizing the massive factories of the day, the CIO benefited from
President Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s New Deal policies—particularly pas-
sage of the National Labor Relations Act in 1935. Realizing how critical
Roosevelt’s re-election would be in 1936, the CIO established Labor’s Non-
Partisan League, an organization tasked with educating members about the
6 SAMUEL GOMPERS, SHOULD A POLITICAL LABOR PARTY BE FORMED? 10 (1918).
7 Harwood Lawrence Childs, Voluntarism in Action, in LABOR AND AMERICAN POLITICS: A
BOOK OF READINGS 97, 97 (Charles M. Rehmus & Doris B. McLaughlin eds., 1967).
8 Wolfgang Streeck & Anke Hassel, Trade Unions as Political Actors, in INTERNATIONAL
HANDBOOK OF TRADE UNIONS 335, 339–40 (John T. Addison & Claus Schnabel eds., 2003).
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importance of Roosevelt’s reelection, mobilizing them in support of the Presi-
dent, and collecting large sums of monetary support for his campaign.9 In 1943,
the League would become the Political Action Committee (PAC), supervised
by Sidney Hillman and designated with the task of engaging in “nonparty, non-
partisan” politics.10
On the heels of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the AFL joined the CIO in
1947 as a full time player in American politics. It formed Labor’s League for
Political Education, which later became the Committee on Political Education
(COPE) in 1955 when the AFL and CIO merged. The unions tasked COPE
with getting “as many union members, their wives and families, and working-
class and minority group citizens registered as possible.”11 This political pro-
gram still operates today, playing a key role in both local and national politics.
Since the CIO’s all-out push for President Roosevelt’s reelection in 1936,
organized labor has remained closely aligned with the Democratic Party, func-
tioning most clearly as a special interest group. Unions have played a leading
role over the years in developing national convention platforms, recruiting can-
didates at all levels, funding campaigns, and mobilizing voters.12 It is a role
that labor has been quite proud to play, with former AFL-CIO president George
Meany once calling his federation “[one of] the most powerful and active polit-
ical forces in the U.S.”13
Despite such self-praise, labor’s political power has been on the wane in
recent years. Unions lost ground in the economy since Meany’s time as head of
the AFL-CIO in the 1970s. In 1973, 24.2 percent of American workers
belonged to a labor union.14 In 2011, that number stood at 11.8 percent, with
only 6.9 percent of private sector workers belonging to a union.15 The decline
in membership meant less money to finance political work and fewer members
available to participate in political programs. Perhaps most despairingly for
unions, some scholars declared the “labor vote . . . nonexistent” by 1980, when
45 percent of union members voted for Ronald Reagan.16
At the same time that labor’s role in politics diminished, other actors cre-
ated avenues for economic non-elite politicization. Community groups, relig-
ious institutions, and even political organizations like the Tea Party presented,
and still present, non-elites a way to indirectly participate in politics. These
groups, however, are generally unable on their own to offer the same type of
voice for workers in democracy as unions. As Barbara Fick argues, these orga-
nizations lack the internal democratic features allowing member control.
9 Marick F. Masters & Ray Jones, The Hard and Soft Sides of Union Political Money, 20 J.
LAB. RES. 297, 302 (1999).
10 Harry M. Scoble, Organized Labor in Electoral Politics: Some Questions for the Disci-
pline, 16 W. POL. Q. 666, 666 (1963).
11 REHMUS & MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 7, at 201.
12 See Scoble, supra note 10, at 667.
13 RICHARD B. FREEMAN & JAMES L. MEDOFF, WHAT DO UNIONS Do? 191 (1984).
14 Union Membership, Coverage, Density, and Employment Among Private Sector Workers,
1973–2011, UNIONSTATS, http://unionstats.gsu.edu/Private%20Sector%20workers.htm (last
visited Jan. 1, 2014).
15 Id.
16 Charles M. Rehmus, Labor and Politics in the 1980s, 473 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. &
SOC. SCI. 40, 46 (1984).
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Instead, they offer ideas on the “supply-side” and sell them to their member-
ships, unlike unions, that operate by worker-initiated mandates.17 Organized
labor, therefore, continues to represent the most formidable entity for politiciz-
ing economic non-elites (though it should be noted that in some instances
unions have begun to closely align themselves with religious and community
groups, particularly when mobilizing marginalized voters). According to the
Center for Responsive Politics, unions represented twenty-four of the top 100
political contributors from 1989 to 2012. Of those 100 top contributors, unions
represented eighteen of the top fifty donors and five out of the top ten on the
list.18
Along with tracing organized labor’s political endeavors, social scientists
have also sought to measure their effectiveness. Several studies looked at the
effect of unions on political participation, with many finding increased rates of
voting among contacted members.19 A recent study by Benjamin Radcliff on
the issue found that members of a union household hold an increased likelihood
of voting in an election, and greater union density increases the probability of
all people voting.20 A study of Illinois union members also found that union
political education played an important role in shaping how members evaluated
candidates and the issues. The study notes, “[i]t appears . . . that [members]
connected their lived experiences with union security and material gain, and
voted as union members.”21
On the question of interest in this paper, even less research exists about
labor’s ability to promote the direct participation of economic non-elites
through political office,. Carnes provides perhaps the closest analysis, by
assessing the role played by a legislator’s working-class identity in affecting
policy formation. Carnes uses the legislator’s occupation (in which he defines
laborers, soldiers, and union officers as working class legislators) as a proxy for
working-class identity. Carnes confirms that although politicians themselves
ascribe importance to the issue of occupational identity effects on legislator
voting,22 the literature has essentially neglected to study this influence since an
17 Barbara J. Fick, Not Just Collective Bargaining: The Role of Trade Unions in Creating
and Maintaining a Democratic Society, 12 WORKINGUSA:  J. LAB. & SOC’Y 249, 254
(2009).
18 Top All-Time Donors, 1989–2012, OPENSECRETS.ORG, http://www.opensecrets.org/orgs/
list.php?order=A (last visited Jan. 1, 2014).
19 See Carole J. Uhlaner, Rational Turnout: The Neglected Role of Groups, 33 AM. J. POL.
SCI. 390, 396, 398 (1989); see also John Thomas Delaney et al., Unionism and Voter Turn-
out, 9 J. LAB. RES. 221, 221 (1988); J. Ryan Lamare, Union Influence on Voter Turnout:
Results from Three Los Angeles County Elections, 63 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 454 (2010);
J. Ryan Lamare, The Interactive Effects of Labor-Led Political Mobilization and Vote Pro-
pensity on Turnout: Evidence from Five Elections, 49 INDUS. REL. J. ECON. & SOC’Y 616
(2010); Arthur C. Wolfe, Trends in Labor Union Voting Behavior, 1948–1968, 9 INDUS.
REL.: J. ECON. & SOC’Y 1, 1 (1969); but see David J. Sousa, Organized Labor in the Electo-
rate, 1960–1988, 46 POL. RES. Q. 741 (1993).
20 Benjamin Radcliff, Organized Labor and Electoral Participation in American National
Elections, 22 J. LAB. RES. 405, 406–07 (2001).
21 Robert Bruno, From Union Identity to Union Voting: An Assessment of the 1996 Elec-
tion, 25 LAB. STUD. J. 3, 25 (2000).
22 Nicholas Carnes, Does the Numerical Underrepresentation of the Working Class in Con-
gress Matter?, 37 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 5, 5, 10 (2012).
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initial round of descriptive work in the 1950s and 1960s.23 The results of
Carnes’ study conclude that, between the 1970s and the 1990s, U.S. Congres-
sional representatives classified as having a working-class identity were more
supportive of federal policies designed to benefit the working-class than were
other legislators.24
Research conducted by Sojourner also speaks to the issue. His study takes
a macro-level approach, examining the occupations of state legislators and the
union density rates of these occupations in the states. Looking at police
officers, firefighters, teachers, and construction workers, he finds that, when
holding other factors constant, these occupations appeared in the membership
of state legislative bodies at a rate corresponding with level of union density.
This provides evidence at the macro level that unions do help non-elites gain
direct voice through political office. Sojourner’s study ends with a call for a
more concrete, micro-level evaluation of how unions support the political aspi-
rations of economic non-elites.25 Our study takes a first step in doing this.
THEORY AND MODEL
Our study of the association between union membership and political par-
ticipation can be rooted in social identity theory (or, more specifically, social
identification theory). Essentially, the concept of social identity views individu-
als as rational choosers who glean self-perception from selecting themselves
into particular categories based around, for instance, their workplace environ-
ment, their affiliation with a religious group, or their ethnicity.26 In associating
themselves this way, individuals develop a sense of belonging to the group,27
and in some instances engage in either conscious or subconscious behavioral
discrimination, whereby they view their own group as being superior to
others.28
Union membership constitutes a clear example whereby an opportunity
occurs for individuals to engage in what might be termed “positive behavioral
discrimination,” in which a perceived association with the union yields a
behavioral change favoring the policies promoted by the union.29 However,
few scholars have explored this notion in depth. There have been some sugges-
tions that union organizing efforts, as well as strong union leadership, serve to
encourage social identification and spread the values and policies promoted by
23 DONALD R. MATTHEWS, THE SOCIAL BACKGROUND OF POLITICAL DECISION-MAKERS
28–30 (1954).
24 Carnes, supra note 22, at 16, 23.
25 See generally Aaron J. Sojourner, Do Unions Promote Members’ Electoral Office Hold-
ing? Evidence from Correlates of State Legislatures’ Occupational Shares, 66 INDUS. &
LAB. REL. REV. 467 (2013).
26 Henri Tajfel & John C. Turner, The Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Behavior, in
PSYCHOLOGY OF INTERGROUP RELATIONS 7, 16 (Stephen Worchel & William G. Austin eds.,
2d ed. 1986).
27 Blake E. Ashforth & Fred Mael, Social Identity Theory and the Organization, 14 ACAD.
MGMT. REV. 20, 20–21 (1989).
28 Rupert Brown, Social Identity Theory: Past Achievements, Current Problems and Future
Challenges, 30 EUR. J. SOC. PSYCHOL. 745, 747 (2000).
29 See Ashforth & Mael, supra note 27, at 29–30.
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the union throughout much of its membership.30 This transmission occurs,
broadly speaking, through encouraging individuals to shift their behavior from
passivity to activism.31 The clearest expected consequence of this shift is that,
on the whole, social identification around a labor group should promote loyalty
to the union, as well as activism on its behalf.32
Although social identification theory is useful in developing a basis for
understanding worker politicization through union membership, the literature
lacks a model that explicitly explains the causal relationship between organized
labor and the promotion of direct participation by economic non-elites in polit-
ics. In this paper we take the first step in considering what a model might look
like by proposing that workers’ participation in the industrial relations process
creates leadership and skill development opportunities that enable them to suc-
cessfully run for elected office.33 Our model asserts that organized labor’s role
in politics goes beyond lobbying legislators, mobilizing voters, and funding
campaigns. As the next section explains in more detail, we argue that working
in a union-represented job exposes economic non-elites to the quasi-political,
broadly democratic process of industrial relations. This system of collective
bargaining and contract administration provides workers with experience in the
mechanics of shaping policy, albeit on the shop floor. When unions are able to
create direct political participation amongst their members, those individuals
who become involved in politics contribute a non-elite viewpoint to the public
policy debate. As this debate is increasingly likely to include only the country’s
elite (a point discussed in the introduction of this paper), the identification
between workers and their unions on policy issues potentially creates an out-
come effect of increased political pluralism in this country.
SHOP FLOOR DEMOCRACY: ACCESS TO EXPERIENCE AND
LEADERSHIP FOR NON-ELITES
We propose that an obvious, though under-researched, starting point for
where unions enable and develop workers as economic non-elite to serve in
elected political office is at the workplace. In the U.S. model of decentralized
30 See generally JOHN KELLY, RETHINKING INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS: MOBILIZATION, COL-
LECTIVISM AND LONG WAVES (1998); Steven L. Blader, What Leads Organizational Mem-
bers to Collectivize? Injustice and Identification as Precursors of Union Certification, 18
ORG. SCI. 108 (2007); Caroline Kelly & John Kelly, Who Gets Involved in Collective
Action?: Social Psychological Determinants of Individual Participation in Trade Unions, 47
HUM. REL. 63 (1994); Melvina Metochi, The Influence of Leadership and Member Attitudes
in Understanding the Nature of Union Participation, 40 BRIT. J. INDUS. REL. 87 (2002).
31 See CHARLES TILLY, FROM MOBILIZATION TO REVOLUTION 52–90 (1978); Christina Cre-
gan et al., Union Organizing as a Mobilizing Strategy: The Impact of Social Identity and
Transformational Leadership on the Collectivism of Union Members, 47 BRIT. J. INDUS.
REL. 701, 703 (2009); KELLY, supra note 30, at 38; Bert Klandermans, Mobilization and
Participation: Social-Psychological Expansions of Resource Mobilization Theory, 49 AM.
SOC. REV. 583 (1984).
32 Cregan et al., supra note 31, at 703.
33 Recent research has also tried to explain how active involvement in union activities
enables and supports civic engagement by union members in areas outside electoral politics.
See generally Veronica Terriquez, Schools for Democracy: Labor Union Participation and
Latino Immigrant Parents’ School-Based Civic Engagement, 76 AM. SOC. REV. 581 (2011).
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industrial relations, it is at the workplace level where workers directly engage
in collective bargaining and contract administration through unions.34 The
decentralized model also means workers can develop a communal base through
participation in union locals, the organizational level most proximate to the
workplace. In this section we argue that the combination of exposure to the
industrial relations systems and participatory opportunities created by union
membership politicizes and prepares economic non-elites to directly participate
in politics by running for office.
At a technical level, the traditional industrial relations system provides
“the design and modification of work rules and work organization” and “the
management of conflict and the delivery of due process.”35 In doing so, it
makes an important policy contribution—namely, stabilizing the labor-manage-
ment relationship and ensuring uninterrupted production. It uses the mecha-
nisms of collective bargaining and contract administration to achieve these
ends. In deploying these mechanisms, industrial relations provides workers an
avenue for skill development in democratic processes.
Workers select a slate of leaders from among their ranks to serve as repre-
sentatives in the collective bargaining and contract administration processes.
While typically supported by lawyers, contract specialists, and other profes-
sional staff, these elected workers become key actors in the development and
enforcement of the collective bargaining agreement. They will negotiate con-
tract language, represent workers in the grievance process, monitor the applica-
tion of work rules, and counsel colleagues on a whole host of concerns and
complaints. Over the course of time, a worker who may not have held any
formal training, legal, economic, or public policy experience, will become an
expert in labor and employment law, pay and benefits systems, and workplace
policy. He or she is also likely to become a skillful negotiator, a consensus
builder, and a group leader.
While these worker-leaders are developing expertise and skills through
experience, they also benefit from sophisticated training through their unions.
A 2002 survey of national unions found that a majority of unions, covering
90.6 percent of the AFL-CIO’s members at the time, operated independent edu-
cation departments. These departments primarily train workers in the traditional
areas of bargaining, contract administration, union building, and organizing. A
considerable percentage also provide political education, leadership skills, and
economics training to workers.36 This training further develops critical skills
for policy development—in the context of the workplace, it is the collective
bargaining agreement—and provides economic non-elites with a knowledge
base that they may not otherwise be able to access.
At the same time that these workers are developing specific skills and a
knowledge base through industrial relations, they are also building a sense of
agency, which is a key component of their social identification around the
34 THOMAS A. KOCHAN ET AL., THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN INDUSTRIAL RELA-
TIONS 81–82 (1986).
35 Id. at 82.
36 BARBARA BYRD & BRUCE NISSEN, UNIV. CAL. BERKELEY CTR. FOR LABOR RESEARCH &
EDUC., REPORT ON THE STATE OF LABOR EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES 16, 20 (2003),
available at http://laborcenter.berkeley.edu/publications/stateoflabor.pdf.
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union. This sense of agency comes from the knowledge that, in negotiating a
contract and protecting the rights of coworkers, their actions directly and posi-
tively impact lives. In carrying out the functions of their leadership roles, work-
ers involved in collective bargaining and contract administration can point to
the fact that they took part in forming workplace policies and ensuring that they
are carried through by management, the most powerful actor in every employ-
ment situation, whether at a small repair shop or a Fortune 100 technology
company. This is a type of shop floor politicization not readily accessible in the
at-will environment.
In combining the politicized mindset of worker-leaders in a union with the
skill sets and social identification they develop through carrying out the func-
tions of their roles, we propose that a connection occurs between the technical
work of the industrial relations process and politics writ large. By way of their
job, these workers become shop floor politicians, directly participating in work-
place-based democracy. Viewed from a broader perspective, they are complet-
ing the same functions expected of an elected political figure—crafting policies
through negotiations with different interests, protecting and expanding constitu-
ent rights, listening and responding to the petitions of the populace—only on a
smaller scale in the workplace. It is experience, knowledge, and skills that non-
economic elites can use as part of convincing voters of their qualifications for
elected office.
Of course, holding any number of technical qualifications does not guar-
antee electoral success. For starters, a standard rubric of proper qualifications
for a given public office does not exist. And a cursory glance at current and
past office holders confirms that voters do not select candidates based on sim-
ply technical pedigree. Candidates must convince voters that they support poli-
cies that are in the voters’ interests, and that they can see to it that the policies
are implemented. With the need to broadcast one’s credentials to a wide swath
of the public in the face of an opponent doing the same, it is a daunting and
expensive proposition—the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee
(DCCC) expects potential candidates running for a House seat to raise at least
$250,000 within three months of announcing their candidacy.37 Here again,
unions help economic non-elites.
THE LOCAL UNION: ACCESS TO A COMMUNITY NETWORK
In addition to exposing workers to the industrial relations process, unions
offer workers the opportunity to join an extensive network. We propose this
second aspect of our model is also crucial to a union’s development and promo-
tion of the participation of economic non-elites in politics. As previously noted,
essentially all union members belong to a local. This is the segment of the
union structure connected to the workplace. It is through a worker’s connection
to the local union and involvement in its activities that an economic non-elite
augments his or her leadership and skill development with a network of
supporters.
37 CHRISTOPHER HAYES, TWILIGHT OF THE ELITES: AMERICA AFTER MERITOCRACY 150
(2012).
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This network develops from the role that unions play for members that
goes beyond enforcing the collective bargaining agreement and protecting the
interests of members in the workplace. Through various activities, they can also
serve as community bases for workers. Local union functions provide a setting
for workers to socialize outside of work and, depending on the size of the
employer, meet coworkers on different shifts or in different parts of the work-
place. It is not unusual for local unions to host barbeques, picnics, and outings
to events like professional sports games for members and their families. In
attending these events, members can build friendships and closer relationships
than what may be possible just in the workplace. Economic non-elites inter-
ested in pursuing elected office can look to these deeper relationships made
with fellow union members and their families for campaign support and votes.
Local unions also connect workers to the surrounding community. Many
locals provide workers opportunities to participate in member initiatives such
as community events, volunteer service projects, and political activities. Usu-
ally driven by member-led committees (another avenue for leadership develop-
ment), these programs provide an avenue for members to meet and build
relationships with members of other unions, non-labor community groups, and
the local political party apparatus. Taking part in these activities allows eco-
nomic non-elites to couple the leadership and skill development formed inside
the industrial relations process with visible leadership roles in the greater com-
munity, another asset for seeking elected office. At the same time, economic
non-elites are building a base of community support that goes beyond their own
union and workplace.
Given that economic non-elites lack the funding for media advertisements
and other expensive campaign strategies, they must rely heavily on the relation-
ships cultivated through the local union’s community element, both at a per-
sonal and institutional level. At the personal level, economic non-elites need
fellow union members, their families, members of the labor movement in the
area, and other community members to help mobilize voters by phone banking,
walking door-to-door to talk to voters, and participating in other campaign
activities. The institutional support is also critical because economic non-elites
who develop relationships with other unions, civic groups, and the local politi-
cal party through volunteering and participating in their activities can look for
reciprocal support.
Ultimately, our model proposes that the community connections devel-
oped through union membership complement the shop-floor leadership experi-
ence of economic non-elites by lowering the cost of entry to successfully
campaign for elected office. The local labor movement can provide strategic
advice and offer in-kind services to the campaign. Area union members, fami-
lies, and supporters are able to work as campaign volunteers, knocking on
doors and calling potential voters. Economic non-elite candidates can also gain
access to community organizations that work closely with the unions, increas-
ing their visibility to potential voters beyond union member households. All
told, the access and resources provided by unions allow economic non-elites to
match a better-funded rival candidate’s campaign operation. And, when that
rival is an economic elite, the economic non-elite’s own background provides a
compelling narrative of authentic representation to middle class voters.
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CASE STUDY: FROM STEWARD TO SENATOR
In an effort to provide a primary test of our model explaining how unions
facilitate and support workers wanting to hold elected office, we turn to exam-
ples of union members who have successfully won elections in recent years.
We identify in this paper two such examples in Las Vegas, Nevada, where
workers who were leaders in their union, Culinary Workers Local 226, ran for
public office with the union’s support. Maggie Carlton, a member of Local 226
and waitress at a coffee shop in the Treasure Island casino, won a Nevada state
senate seat with the support of her union. Steven Horsford, another Local 226
member and CEO of the union’s joint labor-management training organization,
also won a state senate seat with assistance from Culinary Workers Local 226.
In the following section, we test our model through a case study analysis meth-
odology that relies on semi-structured interviews with these economic non-elite
candidates and key union staff members familiar with their campaigns.
The Culinary Workers—a branch of Unite Here—represent the city’s
thousands of hospitality workers, including in many of the famous casino
resorts.38 Its sixty thousand members include bellhops, laundry room attend-
ants, housekeepers, cocktail waitresses, and many other hospitality employ-
ees.39 Because public policy affects its members’ lives, the Culinary Workers
devote a significant amount of time to politics, including maintaining a political
director on staff. While its lobbying efforts are primarily focused on local and
state issues, the union engages in electoral work for candidates across the entire
ticket.40 Observers note the union’s political program’s success with member
voter registration and mobilization methods for ensuring workers are heard at
the polling place.41 Less is known about its success in helping worker candi-
dates successfully run for office and directly participate in the deliberative pro-
cess that ultimately shapes policy.
One such member candidate is Maggie Carlton, a fourteen-year Culinary
Workers member who, as previously mentioned, worked as a waitress at the
Treasure Island casino while successfully running for and then serving in pub-
lic office.42 Her shop floor experiences as a union member influenced her path
38 Our Union/History, CULINARY WORKERS UNION LOC. 226, http://www.culinaryunion226
.org/union/history (last visited Jan. 23, 2014). Culinary Workers Local 226 members also
work in the casinos of Reno, Nevada. Our Union/Contact Us, CULINARY WORKERS UNION
LOC. 226, http://www.culinaryunion226.org/union/contact (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
39 Our Union, CULINARY WORKERS UNION LOC. 226, http://www.culinaryunion226.org/un
ion (last visited Jan. 23, 2014).
40 Interview with Union Official 1, in Las Vegas, Nev. (June 6–7, 2012); Interview with
Union Official 2, in Las Vegas, Nev. (June 6–7, 2012). The union’s health and pension fund
also lobbies independently on related policies.
41 See Ronald Brownstein & Kathleen Hennessey, Latino Vote Still Lags Its Potential, L.A.
TIMES (Sept. 25, 2004), http://articles.latimes.com/2004/sep/25/nation/na-latinovote25;
Melanie Trottman & Brody Mullins, Election 2012: Unions Rejigger Political Spending,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2012, at A4, available at http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001
424052970204778604577243590542178300?mg=reno64-wsj.
42 Having developed an interest in healthcare from her time as shop steward and a member
of the legislature, Maggie left Treasure Island to work for a healthcare-focused nonprofit in
2000. Interview with Maggie Carlton, Steward, Culinary Workers Union Local 226, in Las
Vegas, Nev. (June 6–7, 2012).
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to political candidacy. In addition to her job as a waitress in the casino’s coffee
shop, Carlton served as a bargaining team member, shop steward, and volunteer
on the union’s organizing and political campaigns. She participated in negotia-
tions for three collective bargaining agreements, represented colleagues
through daily contract administration, and helped non-union hospitality work-
ers in Las Vegas join the Culinary Workers and gain a voice in their own
workplaces.43
Through these leadership roles within the union, Carlton gained experi-
ence directly crafting workplace policy and advocating for workers’ interests,
which is consistent with our model. Reflecting on the experience, Carlton notes
she learned about “working with people, the drive for consensus, learning to
put groups of folks together.”44 In a manner mirroring our own political sys-
tem’s fundamental tenets, Carlton operated in a process where “the goal was
always to put all of the different parties together and come up with a
consensus.”45
As a union steward, Carlton also took part in continuous trainings cover-
ing a variety of topics. Some of the trainings focused on organizational-devel-
opment-type skills, attributes that in the context of labor-management relations
built better worker power, and in the politics arena created cohesion around
important policy initiatives. Others were on important policies, such as the spe-
cific elements of healthcare coverage. Through the frequent trainings made
available by the Culinary Workers, Carlton gained a substantial knowledge
base and skill set that she could later deploy as an elected official.
Her path to political office began when Culinary Workers staff told a
group of stewards, including Carlton, that they thought it would be valuable to
have a worker candidate run for office in a Las Vegas-area state senate district.
The union “thought that everyday people who wait on tables, clean rooms, and
make food should have a voice as compared to lawyer-dominated legislatures,
business-dominated legislatures. That the common sense of the average person
was just getting drowned out, that’s why [the union] wanted to elect some of
[its] own to be in the state legislature.”46
After looking at the legislative map on the office wall and realizing she
lived in the district, Carlton brought her eligibility up with the union’s political
director. Her motivation for doing so came in part from curiosity and in part
from an interest in growing up in a politically active, union family. She also
knew she could tell the working families in the district that she understood
what they faced, because she too punched in and out at work each day.47 Here,
it is clear that her identity as a union member guided her view of public policy.
While Carlton independently decided to run for office, she looked to the
Culinary Workers’ leadership and staff for counsel to determine whether it was
a worthwhile endeavor. As the strategic political experts, they walked through
Carlton’s community involvement with her and considered any potential weak-
nesses that could derail her campaign. One senior union leader explains, “We
43 Id.
44 Id.
45 Id.
46 Interview with Union Official 2, supra note 40.
47 Interview with Maggie Carlton, supra note 42.
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very much want our members to run, but we don’t want them to go on suicide
missions.”48 And as a working mom unconnected to Nevada’s political estab-
lishment, Carlton understood that she would need the support of her Culinary
Workers brothers and sisters to win election.49
Carlton won her election that year, unseating an establishment-backed
incumbent in the Democratic primary before emerging victorious in the general
election. Throughout both the primary and general campaigns, she walked the
streets of her district after work each night, introducing herself to voters and
sharing how she would represent the interests of ordinary workers in the State
Senate. The Culinary Workers supported her by mobilizing voters in door-to-
door communications and phone banking.50 A union leader remembers, “[Carl-
ton] didn’t have much money, but we had boots on the ground. . . . It was a
primary. It was hotter than hell, and we had people on the street.”51
Arriving at the statehouse in Carson City, Carlton jumped into learning
how to legislate. Thinking back to those first days in office, she says, “You
have to learn protocol, all of the rules, there’s just so much to learn. And then
you have to figure out how to dress and act. I was a waitress. I wore uniforms
every day, I didn’t have suits!”52 Undeterred by the pomp and circumstance of
the statehouse, Carlton started work on a variety of pro-worker policy initia-
tives, providing the perspective of a working mother in committee hearings and
caucus conferences. These were her interests as a working elected leader, not a
checklist from anyone.53 A union official noted that, “[The union] didn’t have a
set agenda. We just wanted the average person to have their voice be heard.”54
When the legislature wasn’t in session, Carlton kept working as a waitress at
Treasure Island. She did this throughout her twelve years in the state senate
before term limits forced her to move to the state assembly, where she contin-
ues to serve.55
Another Culinary Union member who ran for office as an economic non-
elite is outgoing Nevada State Senate Majority Leader Steven Horsford. While
he does not work in Las Vegas’s casinos or resorts, Horsford plays a pivotal
role in ensuring that those who do have the skills needed to succeed and pros-
per in the gaming and resort tourism industry. Before running for office, he led
the Culinary Academy of Las Vegas, a Taft-Hartley training program jointly
operated by the Culinary Workers and Las Vegas casinos where members
work,56 a job Horsford held outside of his state senate assignment.
48 Interview with Union Official 2, supra note 40.
49 Interview with Union Official 2, supra note 40; interview with Maggie Carlton, supra
note 42.
50 Interview with Union Official 2, supra note 40; interview with Maggie Carlton, supra
note 42.
51 Interview with Union Official 2, supra note 40.
52 Interview with Maggie Carlton, supra note 42.
53 Id.
54 Interview with Union Official 2, supra note 40.
55 Interview with Maggie Carlton, supra note 42.
56 2013 Media Kit: How Hospitality Works, CULINARY ACAD. OF LAS VEGAS 3–4 (2013),
http://www.theculinaryacademy.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/02/CulinaryAcademyMedia
KitUpdate2013-r2.pdf.
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Horsford’s position at the confluence of labor-management collaboration
provides a unique wrinkle for testing our model. Most obviously, he holds a
managerial position and therefore may not approach work, the union, and his
view of the workplace in the same way as a traditional worker like Carlton
might. He also comes into contact with the traditional industrial relations pro-
cess in a different manner than Carlton. As the leader of a joint program, Hors-
ford is charged with implementing the policies negotiated by labor and
management, rather than crafting the policy itself. Nevertheless, his job directly
connects to industrial relations and, therefore, provides another way to test our
model of how unions facilitate and support economic non-elites who want to
run for elected office.
Unlike Carlton, Horsford did not become associated with the Culinary
Workers as a bargaining unit member. His relationship with the union grew out
of its rapid response efforts after the September 11th terrorist attacks, which
immediately damaged Las Vegas’s economy. The halt to air traffic and fears of
more attacks on popular U.S. destinations led to a significant drop in casino
revenue, and nearly 25,000 Las Vegas workers lost their jobs within a week of
the attacks.57 The Culinary Workers’ hall served as a crisis center, where the
union led efforts to coordinate assistance help for displaced workers with
numerous agencies and organizations.58 Horsford’s employer at the time, a
public affairs firm, loaned him to the coordination effort.59
Participating in the union’s community assistance program proved to be a
seminal moment in Horsford’s life. He remembers, “It was an opportunity for
me to see that I could actually make an impact in my community. I could come
back to the community that I had been born and raised in and work with our
partners . . . to help people get what they needed.”60 It also connected with his
previous union affiliation as a student member of the National Education Asso-
ciation while attending the University of Nevada, Reno. Soon after this experi-
ence, Horsford jumped at the opportunity to lead the Culinary Academy and its
sister non-profit, Nevada Partners, eventually focusing only on the Culinary
Academy.61
Just as Carlton gained shop floor experience advocating for worker inter-
ests and crafting workplace policy, Horsford gained similar experience leading
seemingly partisan opponents—represented by the Culinary Workers and the
union Las Vegas casinos—in developing programs benefiting both sides.
Through the Culinary Academy, workers gain training opportunities that are
critical to career development in Las Vegas’s hospitality industry. In turn, the
casinos and resorts benefit from high performing, high skilled employees.62
57 Interview with Steven Horsford, Senate Majority Leader, Nev. State Senate, in Las
Vegas, Nev. (June 6–7, 2012).
58 J. Patrick Coolican, Culinary Head D. Taylor Poised for New Challenge as National
Leader, LAS VEGAS SUN (Nov. 25, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://www.lasvegassun.com/news
/2012/nov/25/local-labor-leader-d-taylor-standing-workers/.
59 Interview with Steven Horsford, supra note 57.
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id.
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Horsford notes that his Culinary Academy work provides valuable experi-
ence for serving in elected office, particularly in his most recent role as Nevada
Senate Majority Leader. Just as the political arena contains varied factions and
interests clamoring for attention, Horsford must work to find ways to satisfy
multiple interests in the labor-management partnership. He notes, “[The Culi-
nary Academy leadership] have a very delicate balance to make sure that we’re
achieving the objectives [of all stakeholders] . . . and forging consensus some-
times when it does not look like it is there initially.” To give just one example,
when stakeholders raised concerns about the predominance of training pro-
grams such as English language classes geared toward the Latino community,
Horsford and the Culinary Academy developed a program that helped rank-
and-file employees gain the skill sets necessary to move into frontline supervi-
sory positions.63
With a lifelong interest in public policy, Horsford decided to run for state
senate in 2004. Like Carlton, he looked to the Culinary Workers for strategic
advice, speaking with the union’s seasoned staff about the details of running for
public office. Horsford won a crowded Democratic primary and, later, the gen-
eral election with assistance from the union. Like in Carlton’s campaign, Culi-
nary Workers’ members helped register voters, knocked on doors, and
participated in phone banking operations to garner support for Horsford in his
district.64
In office, Horsford ascended through the Democratic caucus, eventually
becoming the first African-American senate majority leader in Nevada’s his-
tory. He dedicated himself to passing policies that help all workers, including
raising the minimum wage and improving the delivery of health care through-
out the state.65 Horsford sees his legislative work as an extension of his full
time work with the Culinary Academy, just as Carlton brings the life exper-
iences of a working mom to her political role. He notes, “What I have tried to
do in my experience at the [Culinary Academy] has been to try to inform [the
legislative work], not just for union members, but for all people that are trying
to get access to employment or trying to move their career or advance their
career.”66
Horsford recently won election to the U.S. House of Representatives in
Nevada’s 4th District. While campaigning for the seat, he spoke of hoping to
take his labor-management partnership experience to Washington and impact
national public policy. In fact, Horsford notes the lack of non-elites in Con-
gress, stating “[I]t’s a big part of what we need in DC—people who actually
understand the plight of the ninety-nine percent of us who are in the working
class.”67
While a sample size of two is by no means quantitatively conclusive, the
case study analysis of Maggie Carlton and Steven Horsford’s journeys from
union members to elected officials supports our model’s explanation of how
unions facilitate and support economic non-elites who want to run for elected
63 Id.
64 Id.; interview with Union Official 2, supra note 40.
65 Interview with Steven Horsford, supra note 57.
66 Id.
67 Id.
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office. For both individuals, there was no obvious route to independently run-
ning for elected office. Even Horsford, who had more exposure to the manage-
ment of Las Vegas’s largest employers and arguably  had access to a broader
base of financial support, relied on his relationship with Culinary Workers
Local 226 for strategic political direction and voter mobilization support. And,
both identified as union members interested in pursuing public policy that ben-
efits the working class.
We see the union and presence of the industrial relations process influenc-
ing both Carlton and Horsford’s campaigns. Both candidates identified their
experiences operating within the industrial relations process as a qualification
for holding elected office. Carlton pointed to her time advocating for her co-
workers and being a part of contract negotiations. Horsford referred to the con-
sensus building required in a labor-management partnership as a tool that he
could bring to the statehouse. The two candidates also relied on the community
element of union membership to achieve electoral success. As economic non-
elites, Carlton and Horsford did not have the financial resources to indepen-
dently staff campaign teams and use an expensive media strategy. They looked
to Culinary Workers Local 226’s political program for assistance, which pro-
vided canvassers, phone banks, and other campaign support.
One interesting observation gleaned from the case study analysis is the
role of the union as strategic advisor. While we expected candidates to use the
relationships gained through union membership in their campaigns, our model
did not originally incorporate the pre-campaign advisory facet of a union’s role
in facilitating and supporting economic non-elites who want to run for elected
office. Before declaring their candidacies, both Carlton and Horsford talked
with union staff about the feasibility of running for office. Here it seems the
union plays equal parts pollster, pundit, and strategist. The obvious high stakes
of running for elected office require such a systematic review. For an economic
non-elite, though, it is an element of running for elected office that can be cost
prohibitive. Having access to a union’s strategic political resources helps lower
the cost of entry for candidates like Carlton and Horsford to run for office, and
further plays a role in facilitating and supporting economic non-elite
candidates.
CONCLUSION
Coming out of a presidential election year where candidates vied to
represent the interests of middle class workers while spending record amounts
of money, it is appropriate to consider the role of unions in a political system
that is seemingly becoming less accessible to economic non-elite candidates.68
And, while a significant literature exists explaining labor’s electoral processes
(i.e. voter mobilization and education), less is known about how unions assist
economic non-elites who want to run for elected office and, thereby, promote
pluralism by injecting non-elite voices into the policy making arena. Recent
research has made important contributions to understanding the issue by identi-
68 Fredreka Schouten & Christopher Schnaars, Records: Presidential Race History’s Most
Expensive, USA TODAY (Dec. 7, 2012, 1:26 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news
/politics/2012/12/07/presidential-campaign-spending/1753971/.
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fying that occupational background influences policy makers’ voting records
and establishing a relationship between the union density of certain occupations
and their presence in state legislatures.69 This paper aims to build off of these
efforts by explaining at a micro-level how unions facilitate and support eco-
nomic non-elite candidates for elected office.
We propose an initial model demonstrating how unions do this. Our model
asserts that unions provide economic non-elites with the ability to develop the
tools necessary to successfully run for elected office through participation in
the industrial relations process and the union’s membership initiatives. In the
industrial relations process, workers develop expertise in crafting shop floor
policy and representing constituent interests through collective bargaining and
contract administration. These skills transfer over to the political arena and pro-
vide economic non-elites with a demonstrable leadership and technical record
to rely on in a campaign. The union’s membership initiatives provide an avenue
for economic non-elites to build a broad base of community support and attain
greater visibility. Together, these two elements of union membership allow
economic non-elites to run for office at a time when campaigning is an
extremely expensive endeavor and a widening disparity exists between the eco-
nomic standing of policy makers and citizens.
We tested our model in a case study analysis of two union members who
ran for state senate seats in Las Vegas, Nevada, area districts. Maggie Carlton
and Steven Horsford, both members of Culinary Workers Local 226, entered
politics with the assistance of the union. While both candidates have different
backgrounds—Carlton was a waitress, while Horsford managed a joint labor-
management training center—neither had an obvious opportunity to self-fund
their campaigns. Our analysis of each candidate supports the model: Carlton
and Horsford’s experience in the industrial relations process and access to
opportunities that come with union membership provided political skill sets that
they relied on to win their respective campaigns. In addition, we discovered in
both cases that the union served a pre-campaign advisory role that our model
did not originally consider.
While these case studies provide preliminary support for our model, more
analysis is needed to confirm our thesis. Future research must provide more
diversity in occupations, geography, and actors, variables that could confound
the findings of our study. As an example, is the support found for Carlton and
Horsford unique to the Culinary Workers or Unite Here locals? Or would an
economic non-elite candidate running for elected office in a district with less
union density than Las Vegas find the same success, even with union support?
Considering these questions through both qualitative and quantitative methods
will prove valuable.
Understanding how unions facilitate and support economic non-elite can-
didates for elected office does more than answer an interesting research ques-
tion. As elections become more expensive and more policy makers come from
the ranks of economic elites, it is crucial to explore paths for expanding plural-
69 See generally Carnes, supra note 23; Sojourner, supra note 25, at 474–84.
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ism in the U.S. political system.70 Unions that facilitate and support economic
non-elite candidates for office are helping to cultivate this path, widening
access to democracy for everyday citizens.
70 As elections become more expensive, unions also face a question of how best to use
limited resources to broaden support for worker-friendly public policy. Cultivating and sup-
porting economic non-elite candidates may come at the expense of other strategies geared
toward pressuring non-union politicians.
